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The Impact of Specific Supplier Development Efforts on Buyer 
Competitive Advantage: An Empirical Model 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper examines the relationships between supplier development efforts and 
buyer competitive advantage from the buyer’s perspective, and seeks to understand how 
specific supplier development efforts may impact on a buyer’s operational performance. We 
conducted a survey of 142 electronics manufacturing companies in Hong Kong, and applied 
structural equation modeling (SEM) to test a structural model that postulates the impacts of 
various efforts of supplier development on buyer competitive advantage. The results indicate 
that each effort of supplier development has a different effect on different dimensions of 
buyer competitive advantage. Specifically, we found that joint actions and trust appear to be 
the two most critical elements to enhance the operational effectiveness of a buyer, while asset 
specificity improves the market responsiveness of a buyer slightly.  However, supplier 
development efforts like increasing supplier performance goals and recognizing supplier 
progress do not appear to be an effective means and thus should be practised with caution.  
This study provides significant insights into the specific impact of various supplier 
development efforts for both academics and practitioners. 
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1. Introduction 
  Supplier development can be defined as any effort a buying firm expends on a 
supplier to increase the performance and capabilities of the supplier to meet the buying firm’s 
own short-term or long-term supply needs (Krause and Ellram, 1997a). This study 
investigates the impacts of supplier development efforts on buyer competitive advantage. The 
primary research objective is to develop a descriptive model that postulates the possible 
relationships between supplier development efforts and buyer competitive advantage. The 
model adopts the buying firm’s perspective as a basis for understanding the performance 
implications of supplier development and investigating how different characteristics of 
supplier development efforts influence buyer competitive performance outcomes. 
As more and more manufacturing firms have realized the importance of the 
performance of their suppliers to the establishment and sustaining of their competitive 
advantage (Goffin et al., 2006; Li et al., 2006), purchasing research has begun to focus on 
supplier development programs and study how these initiatives impact on buyer and supplier 
performance (Hahn et al., 1990; Monczka et al., 1993; Hartley and Choi, 1996; Goffin et al., 
2006). Of interest to this study are the findings in the purchasing literature that improvement 
in buyer and supplier performance occurs as a result of implementing effective supplier 
development programs (Watts and Hahn, 1993; Krause, 1997; Gunasekaran and Ngai, 2005). 
However, what specific efforts of supplier development will uniquely contribute to 
buyer competitive advantage? The extant literature has indicated that supplier development 
activities (Li et al., 2005), among others, include: (i) increasing supplier performance goals 
(Monczka et al., 1993); (ii) providing suppliers with training (Galt and Dale, 1991); (iii) 
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providing suppliers with equipment, technological support and even investments (Galt and 
Dale, 1991; Monczka et al., 1993); (iv) exchanging personnel between buyer and supplier 
organizations (Newman and Rhee, 1990); (v) evaluating supplier performance (Giunipero, 
1990; Watts and Hahn, 1993); and (vi) recognizing supplier progress in the form of awards 
(Galt and Dale, 1991; Curkvoic et al., 2000). 
The purchasing literature on supplier development has extensively discussed the 
issues concerning the establishment of supplier development programs, and the charac-
teristics, benefits, and management of such programs (Liker and Choi, 2004). It provides 
valuable information for managers and practitioners to understand the reasons for becoming 
involved in supplier development, the process of establishing supplier development programs, 
and the possible benefits that can be gained from supplier development (Reed and Walsh, 
2002; Goffin et al., 2006).  
However, there is still a limitation in the current research on supplier development. 
Although the literature has provided extensive research support for the assertion that supplier 
development is an integrated means of achieving and sustaining competitive advantage (Hahn 
et al., 1990; Monczka et al., 1993; Hartley and Choi, 1996; Burt et al., 2003), these studies 
have not identified the specific efforts of supplier development that contribute to buyer com-
petitive advantage (Robinson and Malhortra, 2005). In addition, the literature has not 
empirically examined the specific impacts of various key supplier development efforts on 
buyer competitive advantage. The key issues to be addressed in the present study concern the 
examination of the role played by supplier development efforts in predicting buyer 
competitive advantage, and the interpretation of the relationships between supplier 
development efforts and buyer competitive advantage in the context of Hong Kong’s 
electronics industry.  
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We begin with a comprehensive review of the theoretical expositions of supplier 
development. We then describe how to use SEM to develop and analyze measurement 
models and structural models that link supplier development efforts to buyer competitive 
advantage based on the theoretical framework proposed in this study. The results of structural 
modeling are presented and analyzed, and finally the implications of the findings for future 
research and practice are discussed.  
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
There is considerable theoretical support for the assertion that buyers’ performance is 
enhanced through supplier development, especially investments in specialized assets 
(Williamson, 1985; Asanuma, 1989; North, 1990; Buvik and Gronhaug; 2000). Barney (1991) 
argued, based on the resource-based view of the firm, that firms that are able to accumulate 
resources and capabilities that are valuable, non-substitutable, and difficult to imitate will 
achieve a competitive advantage over competing firms. Supplier development could be 
considered as actions taken by a buying firm to strengthen the competitive capability of its 
suppliers. Improvements in performance will happen within the unique exchange 
relationships developed between the buyer and supplier firms. This will become unique 
resources and capabilities of the buying firm (Chen, Lin and Huang, 2006). Hence, ultimately, 
the buying firm will reap benefits from its supplier development efforts.  
Economists have long recognized that “resource owners increase productivity through 
cooperative specialization” (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). Perry (1989) pointed out that gains 
from trade between trading partners are enhanced by investments in assets that are 
specialized to their exchange. This suggests that a firm can choose to seek efficiency 
advantages by creating assets that are specialized in conjunction with the assets of a trading 
partner (Dyer, 1996). Supplier development is obviously a relation-specific program. The 
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buying firm expects to realize an advantage over competing firms by converting general 
assets (such as money, raw materials, commodities, general people skills) into specific assets 
and capability (Schoemaker and Amit, 1994; De Toni and Nassimbeni, 2000). 
However, as recognized in transaction cost economics (TCE), increased specialization 
within a production network cannot be achieved without a cost. When transacting firms make 
investments in specialization, transaction costs arise because of the fear of opportunism. A 
central premise of TCE is that transaction costs increase as transacting firms make greater 
asset-specific investments. The standard reasoning is that as asset specificity increases, more 
complex governance structures are required to eliminate or attenuate the costs incurred from 
bargaining with the supplier who owns the specialized assets and, hence, who has increased 
its negotiating power (Williamson, 1985). Thus, transaction costs are presumed to increase 
with an increase in asset specificity. 
However, Dyer (1996) found that Japanese transacting firms (parts suppliers and 
automakers) make greater asset-specific investments than their U.S. counterparts and that 
these investments are correlated with superior performance. These results are not particularly 
surprising since various studies have suggested that Japanese suppliers and final assemblers 
have close relationships and they are often part of a “keiretsu” group (Asanuma, 1989; 
Nishiguchi, 1994). However, it is particularly intriguing to find that Japanese transacting 
firms incur significantly lower transaction costs than their US counterparts, even though they 
have made greater asset-specific investments. These findings are important because they 
suggest that firms can simultaneously achieve the dual benefits of high asset specificity and 
low transaction costs – a condition that could be an important source of competitive 
advantage. Understanding how such a situation is achieved may provide important insights 
into effective inter-firm collaboration. 
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Buying firms take a variety of efforts to improve their suppliers’ performance and 
capabilities. These efforts can be classified into the following categories.  
Asset specificity represents transaction-specific investments in the supplier by the 
buying firm (Williamson, 1985; Krause, 1999). It is the most important and central part of 
transaction-specific supplier development, which includes a buyer’s direct investments in hu-
man or physical assets that are dedicated to a particular supplier. Examples include (1) a 
buyer’s direct investment in assets specialized to the buyer and supplier’s exchange (e.g., 
customized equipment and tools), and (2) a buyer’s investments in training suppliers with 
transaction-specific know-how or providing technical support personnel to suppliers (Joshi 
and Stump, 1999; Donk and Vaart, 2005). Dyer (1996) noted that relation-specific 
investments could make suppliers more willing to make customized items for their customers, 
allow both parties to communicate more efficiently, shorten product development cycles, and 
reduce procurement costs. 
Joint action represents in-depth cooperation between buyers and suppliers on certain 
activities that are important for improving the performance of both parties (Joshi and Stump, 
1999). For example, buyers may participate in the management of suppliers’ operations, and 
suppliers may assist buyers in product development (Lin et al., 2005). As the extent and 
scope of joint activities increase, both the buyer and supplier firms move towards closer 
relationships (Heide and John, 1990).  
Performance expectation represents buyers’ expectation of suppliers’ performance 
improvement (Krause, 1999). Lascelles and Dale (1989) indicated that increasing supplier 
performance goals is an efficient way to motivate suppliers. In addition, rewards for 
suppliers’ improvement are a stimulating vehicle that offers market-based incentives to sup-
pliers based on their performance. These are designed to induce suppliers to improve their 
performance based on their desire for increased business with the buying firm.  
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Trust too is an important factor. Transaction-specific investments will increase a 
buyer’s dependence on the particular trading relationship with its suppliers, and expose it to 
greater risk and uncertainty (Krause, 1999; Fynes et al., 2005). Therefore, according to the 
transaction cost theoretic perspective (Williamson, 1985), buyers must safeguard against the 
hazards of opportunism of their suppliers. Usually, contracts are viewed as the primary 
formal means of safeguarding transactions (Dyer, 1996). However, trust has been argued as a 
more effective and less costly means for safeguarding specialized investments (Hill, 1995). 
Furthermore, Joshi and Stump (1999) suggested that the buyer’s trust in the supplier should 
enhance the effect of buyer asset specificity on joint action in buyer-supplier relations. 
 
As shown in Figure 1, a model that links supplier development efforts to buyer 
competitive advantage is proposed and investigated in this research. The model is developed 
based on the above theoretical expositions of various supplier development efforts and their 
possible links to buyer competitive advantage. In essence, the model is founded upon the 
belief that supplier development is a key component in determining the buyer firm’s 
competitive success (Hahn et al., 1990; Monczka et al., 1993; Hartley and Choi, 1996). The 
model posits that each of the supplier development efforts yields competitive advantage 
improvement to the buyer firm (Wagner et al., 2005). The following hypotheses are 
formulated from the model. 
H1: Asset specificity is directly related to operational effectiveness and market 
responsiveness. 
H2: Joint action is directly related to operational effectiveness and market 
responsiveness. 
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H3: Performance expectation is directly related to operational effectiveness and 
market responsiveness. 
H4: Trust is directly related to operational effectiveness and market 
responsiveness. 
H5: Operational effectiveness is directly related to market responsiveness. 
3. Methodology 
3.1 The survey 
The survey methodology was used to gather data and test the research hypotheses. 
The survey instrument was developed based on an extensive review of the literature. The 
review examined the literature in the areas of supplier development, buyer-supplier 
relationships, and transaction cost economics. In addition, the literature in the areas of 
partnership and strategic alliance was examined for identifying other constructs pertinent to 
this study.  
The survey included multiple scale items for each of the research constructs. The 
survey instrument was pre-tested with three purchasing executives, one from each of three 
electronics manufacturing companies that participated in the pilot study. They were invited to 
review the questionnaire to ensure readability, eliminate ambiguity, make sure that closed-
ended questions had a complete array of possible responses, and identify any other concerns 
that came to their attention. The questionnaire was also critiqued by two academics with 
expertise in purchasing and supply, who were invited to review the survey items for am-
biguity and clarity, and to evaluate whether individual items appeared to be appropriate meas-
ures for their respective constructs. Minor modifications were made to the research instru-
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ment based on the comments from these two sources. The finalized questionnaire was then 
used for conducting the survey.  
3.2 Measures 
Asset specificity: Four items were selected as indicators of this construct. These 
include: “provide this supplier with training in statistical process control (Galt and Dale, 
1991)”; “assign support personnel to this supplier’s facilities (Newman and Rhee, 1990)”; 
“provide this supplier with capital for new investments at their facilities”; and “provide this 
supplier with equipment or tools for process improvement (Galt and Dale, 1991)”. 
Joint action: Two items were chosen as indicators of joint action. These include: 
“collaborate with this supplier in eliminating non-value added activities existing in their proc-
esses (Hahn et al., 1990)”; and “involve the supplier in the buyer’s product design and 
development (Watts and Hahn, 1993)”. 
Performance expectation: The indicators of performance expectation include: 
“increase supplier performance goals (Monczka et al., 1993)”; and “recognize supplier 
progress in the form of awards (Galt and Dale, 1991)”.  
Trust: The indicators of trust include: “we believe the information provided by the 
supplier”; “the supplier is concerned that our business succeeds”; and “the supplier keeps our 
interests in mind (Doney and Cannon, 1997)”. 
Operational effectiveness: Low cost and high quality are important elements of 
manufacturing-based competitive advantage (Hayes and Wheelwright, 1984). Researchers 
(Hayes and Wheelwright, 1984; Porter, 1985; Brooks, 1998; Li et al., 2006) generally believe 
that the objective of operations management is to produce better products or services at as 
low a cost as possible. Therefore, better quality and lower cost are important indicators of 
operational effectiveness in the current study. The items of operational effectiveness include: 
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“the supplier development effort has helped reduce our product cost”; and “the supplier de-
velopment effort has helped improve our product quality”. 
Market responsiveness: The literature suggests that market responsiveness is another 
important competitive advantage with which manufacturers can compete effectively in the 
face of intensified competition (Porter, 1980, 1985; Nidumolu and Knotts, 1998; Lai, 2003). 
Market responsiveness was also found as the second important core competence in the minds 
of top managers in a survey conducted by Harmsen (2000). Two items were chosen as 
indicators of market responsiveness in the current study, which include: “our products can be 
produced faster than before, due to improved supplier quality”; and “our capability of 
responding to changes in the market has been improved”. 
3.3 Sample 
According to the local Census and Statistics Department, there are approximately 
1,000 establishments engaged in electronics manufacturing in Hong Kong. These companies 
constitute the population of our survey. Four hundred and fifty questionnaires were sent by 
mail or by fax to the purchasing managers of the companies randomly selected from the 
Directory of Electronics Industry in Hong Kong (Hong Kong Electronics Association, 2001). 
A total of 147 completed questionnaires were returned, out of which 142 were usable 
responses, yielding a 31.5% response rate.  
As shown in Table 1, the participating companies varied widely in terms of gross 
annual sales and number of employees. The number of employees ranged from under 50 to 
over 3,000. Nearly 48% of the respondent firms had gross annual sales of US$100 million or 
more. Approximately 60% of the respondent firms had less than 100 suppliers in their 
supplier base, and 57% of the respondents’ firms had obtained ISO 9000 certification. 
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 Table 1 about here 
 
4. Analysis and Results 
We developed our research model based on the sample of 142 firms collected from the Hong 
Kong electronics industry.  Table 2 provides the basic and descriptive statistical information 
about the original data. 
 
4.1 Measurement Model  
The measurement model specifies the linkages between the observed variables and 
the underlying theoretical factors (latent constructs), which are presumed to determine the 
responses to the observed variables (Anderson and Gerbing, 1982). In the present study, the 
four efforts of supplier development, namely asset specificity, joint action, performance 
expectation and trust, are exogenous latent constructs, which serve as independent variables 
in the measurement model for exogenous constructs. This measurement model is illustrated 
in Figure 2. Similarly, operational effectiveness and market responsiveness constitute the 
endogenous latent constructs, which serve as dependent variables to the endogenous 
constructs in the measurement model. This measurement model is illustrated in Figure 3. 
Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was used to assess the exogenous and 
endogenous measurement models, respectively. The results are presented in Tables 2 and 3. 
Both the absolute and comparative goodness of fit indices are shown in Tables 2 and 3. It can 
be noted that the Chi-square statistics of all the models were insignificant, the GFI values 
were well above 0.9, and the RMSR values were below 0.1, suggesting a good fit between the 
implied covariance in the model and the observed covariance from the data. In addition, the 
comparative fit indices were well above the general criteria, providing evidence against the 
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hypothesis of being a null model. All these measures suggest that the models have a 
satisfactory model fit, implying that the selected indicators are a good representation of their 
corresponding underlying constructs. 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
Table 4 about here 
4.2 Convergent and discriminant validity 
Establishing the validity component of a measure involves two elements: convergent 
validity and discriminant validity (Campbell and Fiske, 1959). Measures that lack convergent 
and discriminant validity can cause problems in the interpretation of a study’s results 
(O’Leary-Kelly and Vokurka, 1998). Convergent validity relates to the degree to which 
multiple methods of measuring a variable provide the same results (Churchill, 1979). The 
assumption is that if a measure is valid, it should yield the same results when utilized across 
different methods. Discriminant validity is the degree to which measures of different latent 
variables are unique (Devellis, 1991). That is, in order for a measure to be valid, the variance 
in the measure should reflect only the variance attributable to its intended latent variable and 
not to other latent variables.  
Generally, convergent validity can be assessed from the measurement model by 
testing whether the reliability value (loading) of each individual indicator is above 0.50 with 
a significant t-value (t > 2.0) (Chau, 1997; Yeung, 1999). For the current study, all of the 
loadings of the indicators were higher than 0.50, except for one with a value of 0.489. Since 
this was reasonably close to 0.50, it was taken as acceptable. The t-values of the indicators 
were all above 2.0. These imply that the relationships between the indicators and the 
constructs are statistically significant, and provide satisfactory evidence of convergent 
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validity for these sets of indicators. Tables 4 and 5 show the reliability values of all the 
indicators. 
 
Table 5 about here 
 
Table 6 about here 
 
High inter-factor correlations, especially as they approach 1.0, suggest that the two 
sets of items are measuring the same construct. Thus, discriminant validity is concerned with 
the extent to which questionnaire items load on only one construct (Devellis, 1991). Table 5 
shows the correlations among the exogenous and endogenous constructs in the current 
research. Most of the correlations among the constructs were reasonably low, with the largest 
value being 0.671. According to Krause (1999), a correlation value of less than 0.7 indicates 
that discriminant validity is achieved between the constructs. Hence, discriminant validity is 
deemed acceptable in the current study. 
 
Table 7 is about here 
 
4.3. Development of the structural model   
Model development strategy is an approach to structural modeling that employs 
model respecification as a theoretically driven method for improving a tentatively specified 
model (Chin and Todd, 1995; Hair et al., 1995). Generally, a single structural model is es-
tablished and assessed statistically for its fit to the observed data (Hair et al., 1995; Kelloway, 
1998). If the model does not fit well, researchers may modify it based on the SEM indices 
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obtained and subsequently retest the revised model. However, as modifications are often 
carried out in an exploratory or ‘trial and error’ manner, the final model is sometimes 
incorrect, in the sense that it has a good model fit but is invalid in representing a “true theory” 
(Chin and Todd, 1995; Baumgarner and Homburg, 1996). Chin (1995) warned that 
researchers should avoid the pitfall of slipping into an exploratory mode, where the final 
results may be unduly influenced by the vagaries of the data at hand. 
SEM analysis works best in a confirmatory mode (Chin and Todd, 1995). Instead of 
modifying the proposed model according to modification indices, a few competing and 
alternative models can be proposed in an attempt to find out a best-fitting model. In SEM 
several models can be found to have an acceptable fit and the objective of the researcher is to 
determine the best fit among the nested models. Nested models have the same constructs as a 
general model but with fewer estimated relationships (Hair et al., 1995). A nested relationship 
exists between two models if one can obtain a good model fit with a fewer number of free 
parameters by constraining more parameters in the model (Kelloway, 1998). This idea is 
similar to the notion of model parsimony, which refers to the number of estimated 
coefficients or parameters required to achieve a specific level of fit. Blentler and Chou (1987) 
pointed out that in the ideal situation, a researcher has a series of submodels that shed light on 
the key features of the large model and these models are compared. If the goodness of fit 
measures of the more restricted model are comparable to those of the general model, the 
restrictions are accepted. Hence, a simpler model is preferred as it is more representative of 
the theory. 
As indicated previously, the literature on suppler development has suggested that 
various supplier development efforts, i.e., asset specificity, joint action, performance 
expectation, and trust in suppliers, have significant influences on buyer competitive 
advantage, especially on operational effectiveness and market responsiveness. Therefore, four 
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competing structural models (Models A – D) that postulate the relationships between the four 
exogenous constructs and the two endogenous constructs were proposed, which are shown in 
Figure 4 to Figure 7. These four models were applied with different constraints on the 
parameters and tested by Analysis of Moment Structure (AMOS), respectively. 
As presented in Figure 4, Model A is a nested model of the general model shown in 
Figure 1. Model A hypothesizes that asset specificity and trust have direct influence on 
operational effectiveness and market responsiveness. However, joint action and performance 
expectation are hypothesized to have no direct effects on market responsiveness (indicated by 
the dashed lines in Figure 4). In other words, joint action and performance expectation 
influence buyer competitive advantage only by improving operational effectiveness. This is 
in line with the emphasis in traditional supplier development literature of the role of joint 
action in reducing cost and improving quality (Burt et al., 2003), while it may not directly 
enhance responsiveness to market changes. This is because joint action involves mainly 
technical analyses such as quality assurances and value engineering. Model B is a nested 
model of Model A (see Figure 5), which further postulates that asset specificity has no direct 
effect on operational effectiveness. Although Dyer (1996) found that Japanese manufacturers 
experience both quality and cost benefits even though they have made greater asset-specific 
investments, it may not be the case in a Chinese operating context (Humphreys et al., 2004) 
and it is not entirely in line with the premise of TCE (other constraints on the parameters of 
Model B remain the same as those in Model A). Model C is a nested model of Model B. As 
shown in Figure 6, it is further hypothesized that trust has no direct impact on market 
responsiveness while the other constraints on the parameters remain the same as Model B. 
This is more in line with the teaching of traditional management literature that stresses the 
relationship between trust and operational effectiveness (e.g., Deming, 1986). It can be noted 
that both the constraints of Model A and Model B are imposed in Model C. Model D, as 
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shown in Figure 7, is a nested model of Model C, in which it is further hypothesized that trust 
has no direct impact on operational effectiveness. The objective here is to test whether trust, 
the ‘soft’ element in supplier development, is really related to operational effectiveness, in 
addition to the ‘hard’ elements of joint action and raising performance expectation. It can be 
seen that Model D is the most parsimonious model among the four proposed competing struc-
tural models. 
4.4 Results of analysis of the structural models 
The results of analysis of the four competing structural models are shown in Table 7. 
It can be seen that the goodness of fit indices of Models A – C meet the general criteria for 
both the absolute fit measures and comparative fit measures for SEM analysis. The χ 2 values 
were insignificant, implying sufficient evidence for model fit. The RMSR values were well 
below 0.1, indicating a low discrepancy between the implied covariance in each model and 
the observed covariance in the data. However, Model D is a poor fit model with the GFI, 
AGFI and NFI values all less than the suggested criteria for these indices, 0.90. Therefore, 
Model D was rejected even though it is the most parsimonious model. 
The figures in Table 7 suggest that Models A, B and C all have acceptable goodness 
of fit indices. Although Model C is the most restricted model as compared to Models A and B, 
its χ 2 value increases insignificantly by 1.143 (change in χ 2 = 93.751 – 92.608 = 1.143). 
With a change in one degree of freedom, the χ 2 statistic is significant at the 0.01 level only if 
the χ 2 statistic increases by 6.635 or more. A more parsimonious model is always preferred if 
the χ 2 statistic does not increase significantly with the increase in the degrees of freedom. 
After comparison, it is concluded that Model C has good absolute fit and comparative fit, 
which are better than Model A, and as good as Model B. At the same time, Model C has 
better PNFI and PGFI values when compared with the other two models. In addition, all the 
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paths in Model C are significant as the t-values were greater than 2.0 as shown in Table 8. All 
these measured parameters suggest that Model C has a good representation of the ‘true 
theory’ and represents the most parsimonious good-fit model. 
4.5 Interpretations of the structural model 
The relationships among the various constructs in the final structural model are shown 
in Figure 8. The standardized regression weights and t-values are shown in Table 8. It can be 
seen that joint action and trust are positively and directly associated with operational 
effectiveness; however, performance expectation is negatively and directly associated with 
operational effectiveness. In addition, asset specificity is positively and directly associated 
with market responsiveness. This final model conveys several important messages regarding 
the impacts of various supplier development efforts on different dimensions of buyer 
competitive advantage, i.e., operational effectiveness and market responsiveness, and these 
will be discussed in the following section. 
5. Discussion 
This study tested four structural models of the impacts of specific supplier 
development efforts on buyer competitive advantage. Among the four competing structural 
models, the final model was selected since it is the most parsimonious good-fit model and it 
is believed to be representative of the real situation. This model provides important 
information that helps our understanding of the effects of asset specificity, joint action, 
performance expectation, and trust, on operational effectiveness and market responsiveness. 
At the same time, as shown in Figure 8, it also provides information about the relationships 
between the two dependent variables that represent performance improvement, namely 
market responsiveness and operational effectiveness. Since the current research focuses on 
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examining the relationships between supplier development efforts, trust and buyer 
competitive advantage, the relationship between operational effectiveness and market 
responsiveness will not be discussed in detail in this paper. 
5.1 Relationship between asset specificity and market responsiveness 
The ability to develop new products quickly and respond to market change rapidly is 
an important source of competitive advantage in many industries (Stalk and Hout, 1990; Li et 
al., 2006). The final structural model suggests that asset specificity has a direct and positive 
impact on market responsiveness. This finding is supported by the work of Dyer (1996), who 
examined the automotive industry and concluded that inter-firm asset specialization facili-
tates the ability of automakers to develop new models rapidly.  
Williamson (1985) argued that a supplier who wins an initial contract will have an 
advantage in the next stage due to “learning, including the acquisition of undisclosed or 
proprietary technical and managerial procedures and task-specific labor skills”. The 
acquisition of such knowledge allows the initial supplier to subsequently perform tasks more 
quickly than a new supplier, who must come up to speed and develop the requisite know-how. 
Further, a high level of inter-firm human asset specificity translates into knowledge of who 
knows what, who can help with what problem, or who can exploit new information. It 
includes awareness of where useful expertise resides within the two firms engaged in the 
exchange. In particular, when supplier and buyer engineers develop relation-specific know-
how and have substantial experience working together, they are less likely to misread 
blueprints or misinterpret information (Nishiguchi, 1994). As asset specificity increases, the 
feedback loop becomes more efficient. Fewer communication errors will lead to more 
effective feedback, which in turn will result in faster product development and market 
responsiveness (Buvik and Gronhaug, 2000). Cohen and Levinthal (1990) supported this 
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viewpoint and indicated that asset specificity increases the absorptive capacity of the 
supplier-manufacturer dyad, thereby increasing the ability of both parties to learn from prior 
experience. Overall, asset specificity is able to increase the speed with which organizations 
can solve problems associated with new product development and market responsiveness. 
Consequently, asset specificity should facilitate a manufacturer’s ability to respond to market 
change. 
5.2 Relationship between joint action and operational effectiveness 
The final structural model suggests that joint action has a direct and positive impact 
on operational effectiveness. This result is entirely reasonable since it has been suggested by 
many researchers that effective collaboration between functions, and between customers and 
suppliers, is a key way to enhance product quality and decrease operation cost (Womack et 
al., 1990; Dean and Bowen, 1994; Liker and Choi, 2004). 
Providing higher quality products at as a low a cost as possible can be considered the 
ultimate objective of operations management (Hayes and Wheelwright, 1984; Brooks, 1998). 
Therefore, increasing operational effectiveness lies in pursuing ways to enhance product 
quality and reduce cost at the same time. Previous studies have indicated that effective 
coordination in design and manufacturing can enhance quality (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991; 
Burt et al., 2003). As suppliers take on more responsibility for key components within the 
final product, the ability to reduce variations and to increase the reliability of the product is 
expected to correlate strongly with the ability of manufacturers to coordinate design and 
manufacturing effectively with suppliers. In addition, a closer relationship between the buyer 
and the supplier makes it possible for the buyer, on the one hand, to involve the supplier in 
eliminating non-value added activities existing in their processes, and, on the other hand, to 
establish just-in-time delivery systems between the two parties (Kulmala, Paranko and Uusi-
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Rauva, 2002). This combination of factors can lead to benefits for both parties in terms of 
economizing on operation cost, such as inventory holding and transportation costs (Dyer, 
1996).  
More evidence of the direct and positive relation between joint action and operational 
effectiveness is obtained from studies on Japanese firms (Westney and Sakakibara, 1986; 
Clark and Fujimoto, 1991). Researchers have found that close linkages between design and 
manufacturing (both internally and with suppliers) are important reasons for the success of 
Japanese firms in developing high quality and low cost products. 
5.3 Relationship between trust and operational effectiveness 
The final structural model also suggests that trust in suppliers has a direct and positive 
impact on operational effectiveness. This result is consistent with previous studies on the 
nature of trust in buyer-supplier relationships (Dwyer al., 1987; Noordewier et al., 1990; 
Morgan and Hunt, 1994; Doney and Cannon, 1997; Scannell et al., 2000). As indicated in the 
previous sections, trust is a more effective and less costly means for safeguarding specialized 
investments (Hill, 1995). Trust in a supplier can reduce conflict and enhance channel member 
satisfaction (Anderson and Narus, 1990; Narasimhan and Nair, 2005).  
At a fundamental level, suppliers persuade buyers to purchase their firm’s products. 
However, when buyers actively seek more collaborative relationships with suppliers, the 
latter perform an important function in facilitating and developing customer trust (Swan and 
Nolan, 1985). Research has shown that information provided by a trusted party is used more, 
and thus provides greater value to the recipient (Moorman et al., 1992). The reason that 
trusted suppliers and manufacturers are able, for example, to improve quality lies in the belief 
that they recognize the value of shared information between the two parties, and they are able 
to assimilate it and apply it in more efficient ways (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). The more 
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transacting firms share information about the factors that influence quality (i.e., learn from 
prior cumulative experience), higher quality can be expected to achieve (Dyer, 1996). 
It has been suggested that collaborative relationships rely on relational forms of 
exchange characterized by high levels of trust (Dwyer et al., 1987; Morgan and Hunt, 1994; 
Narasimhan and Nair, 2005). The high levels of trust characteristic of relational exchange 
enable parties to focus on the long-term benefits of the relationship (Ganesan, 1994), 
ultimately enhancing competitiveness and reducing transaction costs (Noordewier et al., 1990; 
Doney and Cannon, 1997). 
5.4 Relationship between performance expectation and operational effectiveness 
The final structural model suggests that performance expectation has a direct and 
negative impact on operational effectiveness. This result is unexpected since as indicated in 
previous sections, increasing supplier performance goals and rewarding supplier 
improvement have been recognized as efficient ways to motivate suppliers to enhance per-
formance (Lascelles and Dale, 1989; Krause, 1997, 1999; Li et al., 2006). 
Monczka et al. (1993) argued that buying firms should challenge suppliers to achieve 
higher levels of performance. Only by aggressively increasing supplier performance 
expectation can a buying firm expect supplier contributions to increase at an accelerated rate. 
Moreover, only those suppliers that meet these goals should be kept in the supplier base 
(Krause, 1997). Lascelles and Dale (1989) also noted that supplier improvement should be 
recognized by buyers through offering improvement rewards, such as future contracts or 
long-term contracts. 
The inconsistent results in the current study may be due to the peculiar situation of 
Hong Kong’s electronics industry, in which the majority of the manufacturers are OEM 
companies. Generally, the OEM form of contract for suppliers is typically of short-term 
duration and relies on the flexibility of suppliers to respond to market needs. In addition, 
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OEM manufacturers themselves are not sure of obtaining future work from their customers. 
Consequently, this makes it difficult for OEM manufacturers to reward their suppliers who 
achieve improvement by guaranteeing long-term contracts or even future contracts. For 
example, a purchasing professional from a Hong Kong electronics company lamented that the 
customers are becoming too demanding for both high quality and low cost. However, they are 
not willing to invest too much in a particular customer. This indicates that too stringent 
performance objectives without long-term commitments will only frustrate suppliers and 
weaken their confidence in improving their performance. Therefore, when buying firms want 
to increase supplier performance by raising their performance expectation, they should be 
cautious and should make sure that their expectations are realistic and attainable by their 
suppliers, especially when long-term contracts cannot be guaranteed.  
6. Conclusions 
Through developing a series of competing models for structural analysis, this paper 
investigated the impacts of specific efforts of supplier development on buyer competitive 
advantage in detail. The results suggest that each supplier development effort has a different 
effect on different dimensions of buyer competitive advantage. The findings also suggest that 
supplier development should be undertaken in consideration of the needs for, and the benefits 
to be expected benefits from, the development efforts.  
The findings of this study confirm the general positive impact of supplier 
development efforts on buyer-supplier performance improvement. Our study indicates that 
joint actions and trust are the two most critical factors in supplier development to enhance 
competitive performance of the buyer. Accordingly, organizations pursuing supplier 
development should work closely with their suppliers on product design and to eliminate 
non-value added activities. A high level of trust cultivates a long-term beneficial relationship 
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between a buyer and a supplier, and reduces transaction costs between them. In addition, we 
also found that asset specific investments such as providing training, equipment and 
supporting personnel help achieve market responsiveness, although such their impact is 
relatively weaker. However, increasing supplier performance goals and recognizing their 
efforts does not seem to be an effective way to improve the performance of buyers and should 
be practised with caution.  Given the resource implications associated with developing 
suppliers, this study provides useful insights and challenges from both an academic and 
practical perspective.  
However, the current research, like any other study, has several limitations. First, 
although focusing on one industry can control extraneous variations and create more accurate, 
context-specific measures, future research could establish the nature of supplier development 
activities in other industrial settings, particularly those areas that are important to the 
economic development of Hong Kong. This will provide a better understanding of how the 
variables that influence supplier development involvement and buyer-supplier performance 
are affected in different industry contexts.  
Second, the current research used the same set of data to develop measures, and test 
the path models and structural models developed in this study. Although using the same data 
set to develop measures and test models is a common practice in empirical research, using a 
new set of data to test the relationships among the factors in the final model would enhance 
the validity of the final model. In other words, further studies involving the collection of 
additional data would provide further support to validate the proposed model. 
Third, theory development would be enhanced by multiple research methods such as 
surveys, experiments, and qualitative studies. A multi-method approach within a consistent 
framework could provide a mechanism for knowledge accumulation, research convergence, 
and better prediction. For example, while surveys are valuable in developing the framework 
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of the links between supplier development and buyer competitive, case studies would be 
useful for further understanding the intensity, duration, frequency, and effectiveness of the 
various supplier development strategies and their related benefits. 
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Figure 1. The proposed model of linking supplier development to buyer competitive advantage 
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Figure 2. The measurement model for exogenous constructs 
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Figure 3. The measurement model for endogenous constructs 
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Figure 4. Structural model A 
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Figure 5.  Structural model B 
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Figure 6. Structural model C 
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Figure 7. Structural model D 
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Figure 8. The final structural model 
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Characteristic Frequency Per cent of sample 
Gross Annual Sales (US$)   
     < $10M 26 18.3 
     $10-100M 48 33.8 
     $100-500M 41 28.9 
     $500-1,000M 20 14.1 
     > $1billion 7 4.9 
Number of Employees   
     <50 39 27.5 
     51-200 22 15.5 
     201-500     19 13.4 
     501-1,000 22 15.5 
     >1,000 40 27.9 
 
Table 1. Selected characteristics of the sample 
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Indicator Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Min. Max. 
Asset specificity     
Provide training 3.67 1.605 1 7 
Provide support personnel 2.97 1.650 1 7 
Provide equipment or tools 2.21 1.477 1 7 
Provide capital for new investments 
 
4.28 1.522 1 7 
Joint action     
Eliminate non-value activities 1.34 1.602 1 7 
Supplier participates in buyer product design 
 
3.33 1.721 1 7 
Performance expectation     
Increase supplier performance goals 4.85 1.347 1 7 
Recognize supplier progress 
 
3.28 1.656 1 7 
Trust     
Believe the information provided by the 
supplier 
5.24 .807 3 7 
The supplier is concerned that our business 
succeeds 
5.15 .922 2 7 
The supplier keeps our interests in mind 
 
5.11 .980 2 7 
Market responsiveness     
The products can be produced faster 4.99 1.255 1 7 
Responsiveness in the market has been 
improved. 
 
4.70 1.259 1 7 
Operational effectiveness     
Have helped to reduce product cost 5.11 1.130 2 7 
Have helped to improve product quality 5.26 1.083 2 7 
Table 2.  Basic and descriptive statistical information about the original data 
 
 
Goodness of fit measure Criterion Measurement model for 
exogenous constructs 
Chi-square (χ 2 )  46.567 
Level of significance of Chi-square (P) P ≥ .05 .160 
Chi-square/degree of freedom (χ 2 /df) ≤  3.0 1.225 (df = 38) 
Goodness of fit Index (GFI) ≥ .90 .944 
Adjusted Goodness of fit Index (AGFI) ≥ .80 .903 
Normed Fit Index (NFI) ≥ .90 .928 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) ≥ .90 .986 
Root Mean Square Residual (RMSR) ≤  .10 .009 
 
Table 4. The goodness of fit indices for the measurement model of exogenous constructs 
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Goodness of fit measure Criterion Measurement model for 
endogenous constructs 
Chi-square (χ 2 )  1.563 
Level of significance of Chi-square (P) P ≥ .05 .211 
Chi-square/degree of freedom (χ 2 /df) ≤  3.0 1.563 (df = 1) 
Goodness of fit Index (GFI) ≥ .90 .995 
Adjusted Goodness of fit Index (AGFI) ≥ .80 .945 
Normed Fit Index (NFI) ≥ .90 .993 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) ≥ .90 .998 
Root Mean Square Residual (RMSR) ≤  .10 .004 
 
Table 4. The goodness of fit indices for the measurement model of endogenous constructs 
 
 
 
 
 
Indicator Loading Loading Loading Loading 
Asset specificity     
Provide training .767    
Provide support personnel .805    
Provide equipment or tools .770    
Provide capital for new investments 
 
.690    
Joint action     
Eliminate non-value activities  .790   
Supplier participates in buyer product 
design 
 
 .622   
Performance expectation     
Increase supplier performance goals   .489  
Recognize supplier progress   .631  
Trust     
Believe the information provided by 
the supplier 
   .820 
The supplier is concerned that our 
business succeeds 
   .816 
The supplier keeps our interests in 
mind 
   .689 
 
Table 5. The reliability values for the measurement model of endogenous constructs 
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Indicator Loading Loading 
Market responsiveness   
The products can be produced faster .907  
Responsiveness in the market has been 
improved. 
.740  
   
Operational effectiveness   
Have helped to reduce product cost  .909 
Have helped to improve product quality  .796 
   
Table 6. The reliability values for the measurement model of endogenous constructs 
 
 
 
 
 
Construct 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Asset specificity 1.000      
2. Joint action .589 1.000     
3. Performance expectation .517 .671 1.000    
4. Trust -.026 .117 .239 1.000   
5. Market responsiveness .177 .390 .453 .318 1.000  
6. Operational effectiveness .123 .284 .328 .352 .563 1.000 
Table 7. Correlations between constructs as output from CFA 
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Goodness of fit measure Criterion Model A Model B Model C Model D 
Absolute fit measurements      
Chi-square (χ 2 )  91.508 92.608 93.751 143.153 
Degrees of freedom (df)  77 78 79 80 
Level of significance of Chi-square P ≥ .05 .124 .124 .123 .001 
Chi-square/degree of freedom (χ 2 /df) ≤  3.0 1.188 1.187 1.187 1.789 
Goodness of fit Index (GFI) ≥ .90 .921 .920 .920 .881 
Root Mean Square Residual (RMSR) ≤  .10 .011 .012 .013 .031 
Absolute fit measure      
Normed Fit Index (NFI) ≥ .90 .906 .905 .903 .853 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) ≥ .90 .983 .983 .983 .928 
Adjusted Goodness of fit Index (AGFI) ≥ .80 .877 .878 .879 .823 
Parsimonious fit measure      
Parsimony Normed Fit Index (PNFI)  .664 .672 .680 .658 
Parsimony Goodness of Fit Index (PGFI)  .591 .598 .606 .595 
 
Table 7. The goodness of fit measures of competing structural models 
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Dependent variable Independent 
variable 
Standardized regression 
weight 
t-value 
Market 
responsiveness 
Asset specificity .201 2.362 
 Operational 
effectiveness 
.620 6.471 
Operational 
effectiveness 
Joint action .477 3.498 
 Performance 
expectation 
-.187 -2.069 
 Trust .463 3.486 
Table 8. The regression weights and t-values of the final structural model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
